Reflections on Courage (And Other Virtues): A Dialogue Between Ethics and Moral Psychology by Cook, Martin L.
The International Journal of Ethical 
Leadership 
Volume 2 Article 12 
2013 
Reflections on Courage (And Other Virtues): A Dialogue Between 
Ethics and Moral Psychology 
Martin L. Cook 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel 
 Part of the Applied Ethics Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, 
Leadership Studies Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cook, Martin L. (2013) "Reflections on Courage (And Other Virtues): A Dialogue Between Ethics and Moral 
Psychology," The International Journal of Ethical Leadership: Vol. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol2/iss1/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Cross Disciplinary Publications at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The International 
Journal of Ethical Leadership by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons. 
102
Leaders of Character? The Dangers of ‘Integrity’
Martin L. Cook 
Stockdale Chair of Professional Military Ethics,
US Naval War College
It’s commonly presumed that good character inoculates against shift-
ing fortune . . . the person of good character will do well, even under 
substantial pressure to moral failure, while the person of bad character 
is someone on whom it would be foolish to rely. In this view, it’s 
character, more than circumstance, that decided the moral texture 
of a life; as the old saw has it, character is destiny. 
—John M. Doris
Military Moral Vocabulary
All of the US military academies, and most postcommissioning professional 
military education, talk a great deal about the importance of the ethical foun-
dation of the profession of arms. All of the academies have honor codes (or 
an honor concept, in the case of the Naval Academy). Those codes reflect an 
assumption that cadets and midshipmen who mature under them will acquire 
firm and abiding moral habits of honesty and rectitude they will carry forward 
throughout their careers. Each of the academies has a center devoted to character 
development and administration of the honor system. These centers conduct 
programs, conferences, and training events continuously. All this activity only 
makes sense if one believes that by repeated exposure, the cumulative effect 
will contribute to the formation of firm and unshakeable character.
Further, all the academies teach a core course in ethics, which is a mixture 
of basic philosophical concepts of ethics, just war theory, and usually some 
aspects of ethics unique to military service.
Postcommissioning, officers continue to talk and think about the importance 
of ethics in their careers and in the profession. The army in particular has made 
very impressive efforts to inculcate and develop these concepts through the 
creation of the Center of the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) and through 
the programs CAPE has developed. There too, the assumption is that by spread-
ing the ideas and vocabulary of ‘profession of arms’ through the service, it will 
decisively improve character and the overall conduct of the service.
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The philosophical concept of ethics at work in all of these efforts is manifest 
in the somewhat limited moral vocabulary of most military members. As one 
listens to ordinary discourse about morality in the military, it’s impossible not 
to note that the words ‘professional’ and ‘integrity’ serve as all-purpose moral 
words throughout the service. Individuals are praised as ‘having true integrity’ 
and ‘being true professionals,’ terms of praise and approbation applied to a 
whole range of behaviors, from properly shined shoes to brave conduct under 
fire. Behaviors one wishes to express disapproval of, ranging from a messy 
desk to extreme moral failure, are similarly described as ‘unprofessional’ or 
failures of ‘integrity.’
Broadly, efforts at moral education in the military consist of three kinds of 
activities. In the first, the emphasis on training, discipline, and rigid behavioral 
expectations are aimed at the formation of habits. Through the articulation 
of clear expectations for behavior, military bearing, and routinized proce-
dures, military training aims at forming individuals into relatively predictable 
behaviors and relatively automatic responses to challenging circumstances 
that have been shown through time to be effective in stressful and combat 
situations. As we like to say, “the training took over,” or “muscle memory” 
kicked in when circumstances didn’t allow or require reflection.
The philosophical forefather of this aspect of military ethics training is, of 
course, Aristotle. He argued that we raise young people through the selective 
application of pleasure and pain to habituate them to desirable behaviors. If 
this process is successful, not only can they be expected to do the right thing 
when called on, but to do so nearly automatically, and to find pleasure in 
doing so. That combination of right action, grounded in formed habit, and 
accompanied by pleasure that has been shaped by training is a fair definition 
of ‘character.’ Aristotle completed this account with an element that usually 
drops out of the military instantiation of the concept: the role of the rational 
and reflective underpinning of those other aspects of character that he calls 
phronesis—practical wisdom.
The second general type of moral preparation for military service is aimed 
more at moral thinking. Here I mean the time spent on teaching ethics 
classes by the philosophy department. The core academic courses reflect the 
belief that the explicit study of traditions of moral philosophy, just war, and 
professional ethics will inform the cadet’s mind and perhaps improve their 
moral reasoning. Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development has 
historically provided a basis for the belief that exposure to moral dilemmas, 
reasoning about them with peers, and exploring one’s reasons for holding 
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a particular view of the correct course of action will advance students up 
the six-stage Kohlberg Scale. Kohlberg’s framework, the Kohlberg Scale, is 
constructed around two major philosophical pillars. One is broadly Platonic, 
and assumes that if one reasons about moral questions correctly, moral con-
duct will follow (although since there’s almost no empirical support for that 
assumption, Kohlbergians are careful not to overpromise in this regard). The 
other pillar is roughly Kantian. The postconventional stages of the Kohlberg 
scale culminate in something that looks like absolute Kantian principles of 
fairness, justice, and so forth. So the assumption underlying Kohlberg is that 
a particular philosophical tradition does, in fact, represent the pinnacle of 
moral reasoning.
The third major branch of moral preparation at the military academies is 
centered in various activities that cluster under the broad heading of ‘character 
development.’ Many of the character development center programs, at least in 
my experience of them at the Air Force Academy, are aimed as much at the 
heart and emotions as at the intellect. A combination of motivational movie 
clips, examples, motivational speakers, and cultural heroes are presented to 
cadets. The assumption here seems to be somewhat the same as in emotional 
preaching: that arousing emotion and presenting exemplars will inspire and 
motivate moral behavior. Since we all know the high from an emotional 
sermon or the glow after a week a church camp tends to fade fairly quickly, 
it is best to apply the treatment regularly in hopes that cumulative applica-
tions will move the baseline of each individual’s character. Whether any of 
this is true is weakly supported by valiant attempts at assessment conducted 
by all the academies.
Underlying all these efforts are two very large philosophical assumptions: 
that there is such a thing as character, and that the activities I’ve described will 
in combination with each other form it properly. ‘Character’ is understood as 
a stable set of behavioral dispositions, formed by habit and education, which 
can be relied on to guide individuals’ behavior and which others can use as 
a relatively reliable basis for predicting their behavior. That this assumption 
is true seems to most of us intuitively correct and perhaps even obvious. 
However, in the past couple of decades the nascent branch of philosophy 
calling itself ‘experimental philosophy’ has raised fundamental challenges to 
these assumptions. Experimental philosophy in the area of ethics draws on 
a fairly large body of experimental work in moral psychology to draw out 
philosophical implications. The predominant result of this work, if taken 
seriously, forces us to fundamentally reassess our understanding of the whole 
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idea of character. Further, if it is correct, is also provides some constructive 
suggestions about what besides character we would need to be thinking 
about if we wish to improve the odds that morally correct behavior will be 
present in a wide range of environments.
But before I turn to a review of the situationalist challenge to our taken-
for-granted views of character, I thought it might be worth a brief digression 
into why I’ve gotten so interested in this question. As an ethicist working for 
the U.S. Navy, I’ve been drawn in to a discussion of one of the most trou-
bling developments in recent navy history. The navy has been experiencing 
a dramatic increase in detachments for cause (that’s navy-speak for firings) 
of relatively senior officers (mostly at the rank of O-5 and O-6, or Senior 
Enlisted). The vast majority of these detachments have been for personal 
misconduct, rather than operational failures—like running a ship around or 
navigational error. As you might imagining, removing an officer from his or 
her command, especially for misconduct, is extremely damaging to the navy 
and to individual units. 
The inspector general of the navy commissioned quite a good study of 
this phenomenon. Among its findings were these: without exception, the 
officers in question report that they knew their conduct was wrong. They 
knew that, if caught, they’d lose their jobs (although they often report that they 
underestimated the gravity of the consequences). Almost without exception, 
they wrongly believed others around them were unaware of their conduct. 
But in fact, upon investigation, it almost always became apparent that their 
misconduct was fairly widely known and had already greatly damaged the 
morale, command climate, and trust relationships within their command. 
Further, it often takes years for units to fully recover from such events. So 
understandably, the navy is casting around for explanations and solutions to 
such a grave problem.
Just to give you a flavor of these firings, let me give you a couple of 
examples. Recently a commander (O-5), a forty-three-year-old married 
captain of a submarine, went online to a dating site, met, and impregnated a 
twenty-three-year-old woman. To escape the situation (and the consequences), 
he faked his death by email and impersonated someone else in the process. A 
senior enlisted chief of the boat, of the submarine Nebraska, began an affair 
with a female midshipman (mid) on summer cruise, and then continued it 
ashore, flying across the country to see her. His conduct caused another senior 
enlisted guy to begin an affair with another mid—so the person responsible 
for the conduct of the crew on the boat directly caused its deterioration. A 
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navy captain (O-6), head of all logistics for 5th Fleet, was fired for swim-
ming naked in the canals of Bahrain at the end of a drunken party, one that 
included junior officers and enlisted personnel—a pattern of partying that 
had gone on with his encouragement throughout his time in command.
This is just a sampler of such firings. In every case, the individual in question 
had twenty plus years of service under their belt. Of course, it’s possible these 
were individuals who had been misbehaving all throughout their careers, and 
just finally got caught. If that’s the case, it’s not philosophically interesting, 
although it would be important for the navy to figure out how they got 
promoted that far through the system if they were doing such things all along. 
But what if, as seems to be the case in at least in some cases, these are 
individuals who have reached high rank by being squared away ‘officers of 
character’ up until now, and some change in their environment, circumstance, 
power, or something else fundamentally disorients them morally? Could it 
be that changes in circumstance have far more bearing on actual behavior 
than we like to think—and certainly more than our preferred talk of fixed 
character and global virtues invite us to think about? And if that were true, 
ignoring situational factors and continuing to talk of global character and 
virtue is not only a philosophical and empirical mistake, but possibly down-
right pernicious insofar as we wish to do everything we can to insure good 
conduct in practice. 
Since so many of these firings of officers seem to cluster at the rank of 
O-6, I have proposed and will be conducting a study, along with a research 
psychologist friend from the Air Force Academy, to better understand the 
nature of the transition to O-6 levels in the navy to see if we can identify 
any major changes in the environment at that level. Anecdotally, it does 
seem that this particular transition point in the navy brings responsibilities 
that are a quantum leap or two greater in complexity than the level below. 
In other words, in the navy at least, leadership challenges don’t evolve in a 
linear fashion, but rather have sharp and dramatic spikes in a couple of places 
in the leader development continuum. If we are able to find any systemic 
features, it might be possible to better address those elements at the Major 
Command course these officers attend before taking their commands. But 
the general point is this: if the concept of character is less global and stable 
than our rhetoric suggests it is, we may be failing to prepare our people as 
effectively as possible for ethical challenges by inculcating a partial or false 
idea that they can rely on formed character alone to insure their proper 
conduct. Further, it might turn out that neglecting close attention to situ-
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ational factors affecting behavior is preventing us from examining aspects of 
the environment and situation that do affect behavior and for which, if we 
understood them, we might better control. It is that situationalist challenge 
I wish to explore in the next section.
The Situationalist Challenge to Character
Philosophers have only recently begun to engage normative ethical thought 
with a fairly large body of empirical moral psychological studies. Most phi-
losophers who do so are associated with experimental philosophy, a nascent 
and controversial movement in philosophy. Experimental philosophy takes 
the traditional armchair to represent the armchair approach to settling mat-
ters characteristic of Anglo-American philosophy of the past century. That 
approach not only avoided, but extolled the virtues of, avoiding of any taint 
of empirical information. Instead, philosophical ethics in the Anglo-American 
tradition of the past century has tended to focus on analysis of moral concepts 
and examination of ever more arcane (and increasingly embarrassing) thought 
experiments about trollies and the like.
In contrast to that approach, experimental philosophy takes as its symbol 
the flaming armchair. Experimental philosophy issues a call to engage directly 
in empirical examination of philosophically interesting questions, as well as 
to attempt to draw on good empirical research from beyond the scope of 
traditional philosophy.1
For the purposes of our question tonight, the single best book to deal 
with the topic is John M. Doris’s Lack of Character. Doris critically and care-
fully reviews a large number of moral psychology experiments, many of 
which have become almost common knowledge in our culture, such as the 
Zimbardo Stanford Prison Experiment and Stanley Milgram’s Peer Shock 
Experiment. He also includes lesser-known studies as well.
The studies he reviews are usefully summarized as follows:
According to Isen and Levin (1972), 87.5% of those participants 
who had just found a dime in the coin return slot of a public tele-
phone helped a confederate (of the experimenter) who “accidentally” 
dropped a folder full of papers, while only 4% of those participants 
who had found no coin helped. According to Darley and Batson 
(1973) 63% of unhurried participants helped a coughing and groan-
ing confederate who was sitting slumped in a doorway, while only 
1.  See Knobe and Nichols 2008 for the clearest statement of the fundamental aims and 
purposes of the movement.
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10% of hurried participants helped. According to Milgram (1974), 
65% of those participants who were prompted by an experimenter 
administered the maximum available (in fact fictitious) electric shock 
to a confederate, while only 2.5% of those participants who were 
allowed to choose the shock levels administered the maximum avail-
able shock. (Vranis 2004, 284–88)
The conclusion all these studies support, Doris argues, is that situational and 
environmental factors play a very large role in how people will actually behave. 
Indeed, in some cases the situational changes one would a priori think to be 
utterly trivial (my favorite is the finding a dime in a payphone coin return 
as such a powerful predictor of helping behavior!) have extremely significant 
and wholly counterintuitive effects on actual behavior.
Studies such as these force us to question whether the assumption that 
character and formed virtues are as globally relevant (i.e., they remain constant 
in a diverse range of environments) and are as reliable a guide to individuals’ 
actual behavior as commonly thought.
Jonathan Haidt, a research psychologist, has done excellent empirical 
work showing how little rational reflection actually has to do with our 
fundamental moral beliefs, attitudes, and judgments. One of his essays is 
provocatively entitled, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment”—a title which well captures his 
fundamental claims. His recent book, The Righteous Mind is the best analysis 
I’ve seen yet about why the fundamental political and religious narratives we 
have are impervious to rational discussion. Haidt shows that such narratives 
are polarized to the point that people of opposite political and religious 
opinions often seem to literally live in different conceptual universes. Indeed, 
they are so polarized that what one group considers facts, the other considers 
completely false. 
One of the most interesting and important of Haidt’s contributions is to 
note that the modern West has an oddly narrow and limited palette with 
which to paint a moral canvas, compared to most other cultures now and in 
human history. As members of the post-Enlightenment West, we focus on 
individuals as bearers of rights, and on utilities to be maximized. In contrast, 
he argues that most cultures and most of human history have had a much 
richer set of important values and moral concerns. Indeed, he argues that 
one reason liberals and conservatives seem to talk as if they accepted differ-
ent ‘facts’ and live in apparently different moral world is that they do! And, 
while a liberal himself (at least when he started his studies), he believes the 
7
Cook: Reflections on Courage (And Other Virtues): A Dialogue Between Et
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2013
109Cook  Leaders of Character? The Dangers of ‘Integrity’
conservatives’ willingness and ability to paint with more of the palette (giving 
value to issues such as loyalty and tradition, for example) often accounts for 
their success in winning debates. 
Most recently, Haidt has engaged in a spirited and fascinating discussion 
of the relative role of reason in moral deliberation with two other philoso-
phers in the “The Stone” section of the New York Times—a section devoted 
to popular discussion of philosophical ideas. The philosophers, as one might 
expect, wrote two pieces doggedly defending the importance of reason 
in moral thinking and the relevance of moral thinking to moral behavior. 
Haidt’s response is equally spirited, and is entitled “Reasons Matter (when 
Intuitions don’t object)” (2012).
The current Inspector General of the Navy, Admiral Phil Wisecup, has been 
recommending a book throughout the navy called You are Not so Smart by 
David McRaney. This book captures in a fun and easily digestible form a very 
wide range of social science research. Each chapter is organized around two 
opening sentences. One he calls “the misconception,” and it’s what we all believe 
to be true about the issue in question. The second, which we don’t believe 
and would fight to reject, he calls “the truth.” The theme running through 
the book is that many important things we believe to be true about ourselves, 
our character, our autonomy, and even our memories are demonstrably false.
All of these perspectives converge to undermine some of the implicit 
assumptions embedded in military character development efforts. Doris causes 
us to have serious doubts about the idea of character and virtue as a reliable 
predictor of the behavior of individuals in a variety of contexts and situations. 
Haidt causes us to wonder whether appeals to our moral reasoning and efforts 
to improve it are nearly as effective as we think they are. To use another of his 
metaphors, reason is just the rider of the elephant of nonrational intuitions 
and impulses. As he summarizes his claims, “Intuitions come first, strategic 
reasoning second” (2012c, 52). Often, he demonstrates, reason comes in after 
the fact of moral intuition to try to find reasons to support those intuitions. 
Furthermore, even if reason is unsuccessful in doing so, we’re unlikely to 
change our intuitions, and therefore our moral convictions unless (as he puts 
it) we find ways to “talk to the elephant.”
McRaney’s romp through our systematic cognitive errors, while breezy, 
captures a very wide range of empirical research, all of which goes to show 
we really aren’t that smart, and a lot of what we quite sincerely believe to be 
true about ourselves, our memories, our motivations, and even our actions, 
is demonstrably false.
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So, what are the implications for our thinking about officer development 
if we take the challenges posed by moral psychology more seriously than 
our traditional character development efforts have to date?
Situationalism’s Implications for Military Ethics
To some degree, military leadership has long recognized the morally 
corrosive effects of some aspects of context and has stressed the need for 
leaders to take specific actions to prevent moral deterioration. For example, 
poor discipline, prolonged combat stress, and poor leadership are commonly 
recognized as strongly predictive of immoral and illegal conduct on the 
battlefield. Major General H. R. McMaster recommended a book to me that I 
commend to all of you: Black Hearts by Jim Frederick. In this book, Frederick 
chronicles in exquisite and painful detail the pattern of poor leadership, lack 
of discipline, and erosion of morale that culminated in four members of one 
platoon of the 101st Airborne plotting and executing a plan to rape and kill 
an Iraqi girl, murder her family, burn the bodies, and then attempt to cover 
up the whole affair. What’s especially useful about Frederick’s book is the 
dissection of the course of events and the climate that got that platoon there 
and the many points along the path to those events where effective leadership 
might have prevented them. 
So at least at the level of the extreme, military culture and leadership 
recognizes the dangers of allowing situational factors to accumulate that may 
well culminate in atrocity. We certainly understand that sustained combat 
stress, poor unit morale, and poor leadership set conditions that may well 
end in catastrophic moral failure.
What’s important about the situationalist contribution to the discussion 
is the emphasis on the often apparently small, even trivial, changes in the 
environment that may alter behavioral outcomes to a remarkable degree. In 
other words, while we already recognize the impact of obvious and large 
situational factors in either maintaining moral standards or eroding them, 
I think we’ve not begun to think seriously about the factors so small that 
intuitively we’d dismiss the possibility that they might significantly affect 
behavior. If the situationalist perspective is even partially correct, we do so at 
our peril. If we believe that integrity and character possess a global reliability 
and constancy that—if situationalism is taken seriously—they simply don’t, 
we rely on such notions more completely and uncritically than we should. 
Further, if that’s right, we might need to think more deeply about the appar-
ently minor and negligible situational factors that might indeed have more 
9
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influence than we like to think. Doing so would provide a foundation from 
which we can better educate, train, and lead military personnel to insure the 
highest levels of proper behavior we can attain.
John Doris provides a helpful and provocative nonmilitary example of 
how taking situationalism more seriously into account might guide behavior 
to protect against moral failure:
Imagine that a colleague with whom you have had a long flirtation 
invites you for dinner, offering enticement of interesting food and 
elegant wine, with the excuse that you are temporarily orphaned 
while your spouse is out of town. Let’s assume the obvious way to 
read this text is the right one, and assume further that you regard 
the infidelity that might result as an ethically undesirable outcome. 
If you are like one of Milgram’s respondents, you might think there 
is little cause for concern; you are, after all, an upright person, and a 
spot of claret never did anyone any harm. On the other hand, if you 
take the lessons of situationalism to heart, you avoid the dinner like 
the plague, because you know that you are not able to confidently 
predict your behavior in a problematic situation on the basis of your 
antecedent values. You do not doubt that you sincerely value fidelity; 
you simply doubt your ability to act in conformity with this value 
once the candles are lit and the wine begins to flow. Relying on 
character once in the situation is a mistake, you agree; the way to 
achieve the ethically desirable result is to recognize the situational 
pressures may all too easily overwhelm character and avoid the dan-
gerous situation. I don’t think it wild speculation to claim that this is 
a better strategy than dropping by for a “harmless” evening, secure 
in the knowledge of your righteousness. (2002, 147)
The conclusion Doris draws from this is important, and has important 
implications for thinking clearly about how to minimize ethical failure in 
the military. We might more helpfully explain ethical failure less in terms of 
a single failure of moral will and look for “culpable naiveté or insufficiently 
careful attention to situations” (Doris 2002, 148).
Let me hasten to anticipate a likely objection to the argument I’m making. 
By no means am I suggesting that the importance of situational factors in 
influencing behavior can or should be used to eliminate the importance of 
moral responsibility and even of legal culpability. Confusion on this point is not 
just a theoretical possibility. My colleague and research psychologist Dr. George 
Mastrioanni skillfully dissected precisely such massive confusion in Zimbardo’s 
10
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testimony at the Abu Ghraib criminal trials, in which Zimbardo tied himself into 
conceptual knots trying to balance the personal responsibility of the individual 
agents with the situational factors that enabled their misconduct (2011, 2–16).
What the situationalist challenge invites us to do is not to reject moral and 
legal responsibility, but rather to more accurately and precisely locate where, 
as Doris puts it, ‘culpable responsibility’ lies. We may at the end of the day 
want or need to continue to criticize and punish individuals who—having 
gotten themselves into a highly dangerous situation they or their leaders 
should have anticipated—behave badly (as we might have anticipated to be 
highly likely on situational grounds). Taking situationalism seriously invites 
us to ask a wider range of questions and to anticipate and control for their 
negative influences on morally desirable behavior in a way that psychologi-
cally naïve reliance on individual character and virtue does not. I’m of course 
aware that I’m waterskiing at high velocity over some deep philosophical 
water here, and we’ll have to think long and hard about the importance of 
situationalist considerations when we assess moral failure. Are we offering 
situationalist exculpations, extenuations, or just partial explanations?
But for our purposes here, let me stress the positive importance of insisting 
that we think deeply about situationalist considerations when we look at 
military organizations and questions of military leadership. Most importantly, 
it invites military leaders at every level to be more aware of the inherent 
limits of the moral vocabulary of integrity and character. Overreliance on 
character as a reliable bulwark against moral failure is, empirically speaking, 
a mistake and a very dangerous mistake if what we care about in the end is 
moral conduct. Situationalism leads military leaders at every level to think 
more clearly and explicitly about the situational factors at play in their unit 
and to recognize that even matters they might be inclined to dismiss as trivial 
might decisively affect their unit’s ability to maintain high behavioral standards.
Lastly, if we want to do everything possible to prevent moral failure, situ-
ationalism suggests a productive line of empirical research of great importance. 
Studies and observations of the influence of situational factors are essential 
if we are to be better able to control and predict behavior in the real world. 
Insofar as excessive reliance on talk of character and integrity predisposes us 
culturally not to examine such questions, we run the risk of setting ourselves 
up for preventable failures of military ethics.
So my conclusions are necessarily a bit tentative. Experimental philoso-
phy is a new and, in many philosophical circles, suspect field. But there’s 
enough smoke coming from that flaming armchair to suggest to me there’s 
11
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probably some real fire there. And the fact that these questions lead directly 
to inherently intellectually interesting and potentially extremely practical 
important lines of research that might well pay off handsomely as we refine 
training and leader development programs. Military ethics that sees itself as 
the handmaid of the military profession (as opposed to merely philosophi-
cal military ethics) has to concern itself with the real world implications of 
its work. To that end, better dialogue and perhaps even joint research with 
situationalist moral psychology might do more for the ethical health of the 
profession than anything else we can do.
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